tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post2445151584421359439..comments2024-03-28T12:29:39.157-07:00Comments on Graphic Firing Table: Battles Long Ago: First Dogger Bank (The Scarborough Raid) 1914FDChiefhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comBlogger17125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-60766783211321360402019-06-28T16:11:54.204-07:002019-06-28T16:11:54.204-07:00As the post discussed, pretty much everyone who...As the post discussed, pretty much everyone who's looking into it has concluded that the RN's obsession with "faster is better" gunnery played a massive part in the battlecruiser losses at Jutland. It wasn't just a case of the ship design and the manual shell-handling procedures, but that the magazine crews just flat out violated every safety rule IN the book. The British magazines were a disaster waiting to happen, and combined with the more unstable explosive properties of cordite and the more accurate German gunnery, well...<br /><br />One thing I can't really fault the RN for was the protection of the turrets and magazines. To some degree, yes. But the British made the same conscious decision the Allied armor designers made in WW2; more is better, and if we end up losing ships 4 to 3 if we start out with 2 to 1 we'll be okay. And the RN won, after all - as did the M4 Sherman and T-34, so it's kind of hard to refute as a material strategy. As a waste of human lives? Yes, very much so.<br /><br />But, then, ALL wars are pretty much that.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-25927913927231735252019-06-26T15:01:40.379-07:002019-06-26T15:01:40.379-07:00There is a very interesting article on RN propella...There is a very interesting article on RN propellant and how the RN dealt with the issue, is quite eye opening since goes against what is normally accepted as true on the matter, in that context agrees with Campbell's conclusion that RN's magazine safety procedures and equipment simply werent enough for preventing a chain effect right into the magazines:<br /><br />"Though these losses could thus in a sense be attributed to inadequate thickness of armour, there was little that could be done to remedy this in completed ships apart from thickening the turret crowns and additional deck plating in vulnerable positions, and it must be noted that all the British battleships were liable to similar disasters if their turret or barbette armour were holed. Of the 136 barbettes in the four battle squadrons at Jutland, only four, the wing barbettes in the Colossus and Hercules, had more than 10in max and this thickness of armour might be pierced by German 12in shells up to about 14,000yds. Only the six ships with 15in guns, and the Agincourt, had more than 11 in on their turret faces. The real cause of the disasters was that the precautions for preventing flash of ignited propellant reaching a magazine were not matched to the behaviour of British charges, though if the British ships had had German charges it is very unlikely that they would have blown up. This was not, however, clear at the time."<br /><br />http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/index.php/A_Direct_Train_of_Cordite<br /><br />Given how RN BBs blew up even by themselves (Vanguard,etc), it sounds very convincing.<br /><br />JAGhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11801441732898266458noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-40230649405202668722019-06-26T11:07:26.819-07:002019-06-26T11:07:26.819-07:00That was kind of my "what-if" coda to th...That was kind of my "what-if" coda to the post. I think that depending on the course of events they might have seen one of two possible outcomes:<br /><br />If the HSF turns back and the RN squadrons encounter Hipper at the exit to the minefield it's likely that 1) the 1st Scouting Group gets torn apart, losing most, or all, of its capital ships, while 2) the Battlecruiser Fleet suffers as badly as it did at Jutland; the British shell handling procedures were really, REALLY poor, and their gunnery wasn't good. It's very probable that the British lose at least HMS New Zealand and possibly Queen Mary, as well.<br /><br />If the HSF doesn't turn back, though...it's very likely that both the British units - and especially the 2nd BS - get hammered, instead. The battlecruisers could at least potentially get out of the HSF's gun range, but the slower battleships couldn't.<br /><br />The problem with taking that any further, though, is trying to guess what the Allhighest - Kaiser Bill, that is - would have done with that advantage. Would he, as you suggest, have then sortied the entire HSF against Scapa, or into the Channel, in hopes of then winning a larger general engagement against the Grand Fleet? If so...would the results have BEEN a German win, or a tactical draw, something closer to the actual results of Jutland?<br /><br />I don't think the British would have tried to push up to the North German coast to challenge the HSF; they were spooked the whole war over the dangers of mines and torpedoes - as noted in the post, that's why they abandoned their original "close blockade" plan in 1914. My guess is that the war would have taken close to the same course, with the Grand Fleet waiting for Room 40 to clue them into German sorties, and eventually some sort of Jutland.<br /><br />As bad as the British battlecruiser construction was, their battleship architecture was fairly robust, and with the R-Class and the Fifth Battle Squadron providing weight of metal to the Grand Fleet battle line I'd be shocked if the results would have turned strongly the other direction. So there's eventually some sort of Jutland-type engagement in 1916 or 1917, and the Grand Fleet continues to be a "fleet-in-being" and the HSF rots at its moorings.<br /><br />So the next leap - a US-UK RN blockade of US trade with Germany - is an even further remove. It's difficult to see how Germany manages to avoid collision with the US, between the need to try unrestricted submarine campaigns and the overall pro-Allied tilt of the bulk of the US ruling classes...<br /><br />Still, it's an interesting exercise in historical speculation, which was the genesis of this piece in the first place. Glad you enjoyed it.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-68901908535348697912019-06-22T07:31:26.278-07:002019-06-22T07:31:26.278-07:00Hey! No problem, it happens, and thanks for the de...Hey! No problem, it happens, and thanks for the detailed explanation in this very interesting matter, can you imagine what would have happened in the HSF bagged the entire lot evening the odds?<br /><br />I doubt the US would have submitted to the RN blockade (by a weaker RN) as historical and with them the rest of the neutrals, so the RN would have felt compelled to bring the HSF to battle ASAP in order to restore its prestige and maintain neutral compliance with their blockade.<br /><br />An early 1915 battle between two rather equal fleets, only the prideful RN doesnt know their turrets arent flash-tight and prone to catastrophic explosions...JAGhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11801441732898266458noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-8814690118196981352019-06-21T16:58:50.675-07:002019-06-21T16:58:50.675-07:00The actual published tactical maps leave a bit of ...The actual published tactical maps leave a bit of a gap with 3CS. In the first map they're shown sortieing from Rosyth in the Firth of Forth. The next time they're shown is on the final close-up map of the BCS and 2BS search patterns at the exit to the minefield gap; there the ACs are in line-abreast to the west of the 2BS.<br /><br />So on my 4am map I show the ACs as the line of smaller ships to the west of the 2BS on the run to the south; that was my guess as to where Warrender might have put them, given their axis of travel to the rendezvous point and their location on the final search map. I assumed that the 2BS would have been sailing in two columns of three ships - I don't really know if that was their formation, but it seemed like a reasonable guess, given the way the Grand Fleet seemed to like to sail in smaller divisions and only form long lines-ahead for combat.<br /><br />Then I screwed up on the 8-9am ans 12:30pm maps; I just lost track of the armoured cruisers. My guess is that they would have been close to the 2BS somewhere - probably still to the west, and probably in line-abreast as they were in the search map.<br /><br />Then, presumably, the 3CS broke and headed back for Rosyth once the German had evaded the search. But, again, I'm not really sure. I apologize for the omission; I try to do as much research as possible for these posts, but inevitably I drop the ball on occasion, and this looks to be one of them.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-42295304375562428292019-06-21T14:47:43.367-07:002019-06-21T14:47:43.367-07:00Good job!
I have a question regarding the maps, I...Good job!<br /><br />I have a question regarding the maps, I dont see the armored cruisers depicted, I know they were very close to the 2ns BS and was wondering whether they were represented as the second column of three of the main body or simply not depicted and the 2nd BS was steaming on two columns.JAGhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11801441732898266458noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-49967735779519425592013-12-25T11:06:02.553-07:002013-12-25T11:06:02.553-07:00BD: All valid points, and go quite a ways at illus...BD: All valid points, and go quite a ways at illustrating the differences between the institutional culture of the two navies.<br /><br />The RN had real issues with addressing technical and tactical problems. The vast inertia of the seniority system that had descended after Nelson's era meant that there were a LOT of people in positions of responsibility who got there just by "being there"; by not making waves and not backing losers. I love the young officer's comment on Warrender, how during peacetime his stolidity could pass for deep thinking but how wartime exposed the degree to which he wasn't really thinking much about his profession at all.<br /><br />I think Massie lets Jellicoe off too easily; he had his own problems. For example, he recognized the shipbuilding and ammo handling issues before the war but wasn't willing to pursue them. British sailors died because Jellicoe was too much the Organization Man to rock the battlecruiser...<br /><br />The Imperial Navy, on the other hand, never seemed to get over being intimidated by their British foes. You're right; their instinct always seemed to be to run away and sink themselves when push came to shove. Not that there weren't individual officers with the spark; but overall both the Imperial Navy and it's successor the <i>Kriegsmarine</i> suffered from the same basic lack of strategic vision and tactical confidence.<br /><br />In the end Bismarck was right; Germany didn't need any sort of significant surface fleet, and anything more than a notional investment in capital ships was a waste of resources.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-10422523370016654492013-12-23T11:41:30.010-07:002013-12-23T11:41:30.010-07:00Nice work and well worth the wait. This story show...Nice work and well worth the wait. This story shows two major British weakness. They had a number of blockheads in key positions who cost them dearly. The ones who stand out are Milne, who let the Goeben and Breslau get away and was the subject of some memorable invective from Jacky Fisher even before that, and Beatty's flag lieutenant Seymour whose bungled signals also ruined British chances at Dogger Bank in 1915 and Jutland in 1916, because Beatty was too blind or stubborn to sack him for screwing up in 1914. Also there was a distinct lack of initiative in subordinates as shown by the destroyers slavishly following Lynx when she was hit and Arbuthnot refusing Orion permission to fire without orders from higher. <br />A further note on propellants is in addition to burning faster, British Cordite often had Vaseline added in the belief that it would stabilize the Cordite but in fact had the opposite effect, making it unstable and leading to spontaneous magazine explosions like the HMS Vanguard.<br />A final observation is that in both world wars the Kriegsmarine's surface fleet showed a distinct lack of willingness to engage the enemy and an astonishing willingness to scuttle their ships rather than go out fighting. Big Daddynoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-12313839456645466062013-12-23T09:22:32.656-07:002013-12-23T09:22:32.656-07:00A very complex story told well. Thanks, Chief.A very complex story told well. Thanks, Chief.Podunk Paulnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-19960278367932880932013-12-22T13:32:22.849-07:002013-12-22T13:32:22.849-07:00Chief - - Good stuff! Glad to see you doing mo...Chief - - Good stuff! Glad to see you doing more naval battles. Are you going to post it on MilPub? Pretty slim pickings over there right now.<br /><br />Amazing that even with the High Seas Fleet superiority in gunnery and ammo handling (and armor in the case of the battle cruisers) that they could never get momentum over the Brits. Just goes to show that the old saying <i>”…quantity has a quality of its own…”</i> has a lot of truth. That and a good intel bureau like Room 40.<br /><br />Massie's <i>"Castles of Steel"</i> that you mention does a great job – not only on Scarborough but on the naval war as a whole. I note that Massie's references include much from the German side that are not generally available at least here in Seattle. Massie attributes works from Admirals Scheer and Tirpitz, Waldeyer-Hartz’s bio of <i>”Admiral von Hipper”</i>, and Korvettenkapitan Otto Groos’ <i>”War in the North Sea”</i>.<br />mikenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-81855525263474953522013-12-22T02:20:17.455-07:002013-12-22T02:20:17.455-07:00I have to say, I'm still not sure what the hel...I have to say, I'm still not sure what the hell the KM was hoping to do with their surface fleet. They DID come out several times after Scarborough; Dogger Bank just a month later and then Jutland, of course.<br /><br />I get that the Grand Fleet was just that much bigger; 25-28 battleships to the High Seas Fleet's 15-16, so a straight-up slugging match wasn't really in German interests. But the German plans to try and lure out a portion of the Grand Fleet and smash it were hopeless so long as the British were reading their mail, and they never seemed to figure that out. After Jutland the KM stopped even seriously trying that.<br /><br />In a sense the British were in the same position that the U.S. is in southwest Asia; you're right that the German shipbuilding forced the British to devote more resources to her Navy than the Germans did...but the British had that much more Navy that they could afford to be lavish. And the RN was always going to be that big an investment in an island nation; the German activity didn't do much more than force British deployment to counter the threat to the North Sea.<br /><br />But the German surface fleet was almost a complete waste of men and materiel.FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-61568122055546609392013-12-21T20:03:24.747-07:002013-12-21T20:03:24.747-07:00Maybe I am a similar coward, but there are things ...Maybe I am a similar coward, but there are things that you can say to your boss and then there are things you just have to show him and let him make up his own mind.<br /><br />The German Admiralty had concluded that simply steaming out front of Scapa Flow and daring the Brits to come out would have gotten them all killed (and not improved the war situation). I.e. why roll the die if they are loaded against you.<br />Simply staying in port is less bad than losing the fleet. Every new ton of German battlewagon meant that the Brits had to build two. The Germans had a lot bigger <br /><br />At least the raid idea was worth giving a shot. It seems clear that after the raid, the Germans did not think they could arrange a halfway fair shake of the die.<br /><br />Aelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10788190394672505925noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-71212980816219830512013-12-20T07:55:13.973-07:002013-12-20T07:55:13.973-07:00Thing is, Ael, I blame Ingenohl for the moral cowa...Thing is, Ael, I blame Ingenohl for the moral cowardice of approving the mission in the first place knowing that he couldn't justify risking the High Seas Fleet to the Kaiser if anything just like this happened.<br /><br />His decision that morning? No, given the constraints on his action, I think he made the right decision. But, frankly, the Scarborough Raid just highlights how faulty the strategic thinking of the Imperial Naval Cabinet and the KM staff was.<br /><br />Like I said in the post; Germany had to WIN the war at sea to have a shot at winning the war as a whole (and even then I'd say their shot was 50-50 at best). Therefore the German Navy was worthless - or, worse, a huge drain on the German war effort - unless it was risked in an attempt to smash the RN distant blockade and open the sea lanes to German attacks on Britain's SLOC.<br /><br />The German Navy - Ingenohl - <i>should</i> have gone to Wilhelm and laid it out in just those terms; you've built this terrific fleet, but unless you're willing to throw the iron dice and risk it all it's not going to do you any good and, in fact, will actively harm your country.<br /><br />All the subsequent failures were, IMO, consequent to that. The RN didn't HAVE to be brilliant - they just had to continue to be there. The German Navy HAD to be brilliant, had to take the Big Risk, and the officers of Ingenohl's generation didn't have what it takes to do that...FDChiefhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10607785969510234092noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-55366267886833634762013-12-20T03:20:24.537-07:002013-12-20T03:20:24.537-07:00Enjoyed reading that one chief, excellent as ever....Enjoyed reading that one chief, excellent as ever. <br /><br /><br /><br />Don Francisconoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-13573548361371731492013-12-19T12:51:23.360-07:002013-12-19T12:51:23.360-07:00Excellent as always Chief.Excellent as always Chief.Leonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15715768191516712688noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-2956240728541913262013-12-19T10:42:05.660-07:002013-12-19T10:42:05.660-07:00Phenomenal research and great writing and analysis...Phenomenal research and great writing and analysis, Chief!<br />I'm not a Navy man but the hat's off to you...Brianhttp://brtrain.wordpress.comnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31246093.post-58603521738944889702013-12-18T20:49:36.719-07:002013-12-18T20:49:36.719-07:00Great work as usual Chief.
I am even softer on In...Great work as usual Chief.<br /><br />I am even softer on Ingenohl than you. Recall that the order to turn around was *before* the raid on the ports.<br /><br />As soon as the guns started popping in the middle of the North Sea, the original "mouse trap" game was over.<br /><br />It meant that the Royal Navy would not react by sending a fragment of their forces to chase the raiding ships. In fact, it suggested that the deployment of the Royal Navy was not at all as they had hoped (and that the Grand Fleet might already be in the neighborhood given the clashing screens, which indeed some portion of it was)<br /><br />Given the complete failure of the mousetrap plan, any further steaming around would simply be hoping to get lucky by blundering into something juicy. And as we know, hope is not a battle plan. Hence the only reasonable strategy is to pull back and come up with another plan later.Aelhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10788190394672505925noreply@blogger.com