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The full strength of this army in the summer of 1944 consisted of four infantry divisions; 27th, 176th, 289th, and 313th. The authorized strength of a Soviet 1944 rifle division was around 10,000 troops all arms, but the 32nd Army had been attacking for over a month at the time its right and center divisions - the 176th and 289th - approached the old pre-war Finnish border near Ilomantsi. So the total assigned strength of the two divisions together was probably around 15,000-16,000 all arms.
As the battle unfolded and the situation of the two divisions became clear the Army commander committed a division-size force of ground-pounding squids; the 3rd Naval Infantry (Morskaya Pekhota) and 69th, and 70th Naval Rifle (Morskaya Strelkovy) brigades. These units probably fielded about 1,500 to 2,000 troops each for a total of about 5,000 all arms.
(Note: The latter two Strelkovy brigades should not be confused with the Naval Infantry [Morskaya Pekhota] units. The latter, sometimes called the "Black Death" by their German enemies, were raised and trained as marines by the Soviet Fleet, and their organization dated back to the pre-Revolutionary times.
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So a rough total of 16,000 to 21,000 all arms.
(Note: I want to give a shout-out here to Anton Andreich, who added a comment back in January, 2013, that helped immensely by providing some names for the Soviet commanders I had been missing. Bolshoi spasiba, Anton!)
The overall operational commander for the Soviet maneuver elements was, presumably, the 32nd Army commander, Lt-Gen. [Генерал-лейтенант] Filipp Gorelenko. Anton notes that:
"The divisional commanders were as follows:
176th - Col. Zolotaryov
289th - Maj-Gen. Tchernuha"
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The Continuation War - 1941-1944
Finland's leaders had met with the Nazi German hierarchy in the spring of 1941 and were informed of the plans for Barbarossa. They did not share Hitler's territorial ambitions but wished to recover the territory they had lost on the Karelian Isthmus and in "Ladoga Karelia", the area north of Lake Ladoga. After some inconclusive scuffling and air attacks the Finnish Army attacked in July of 1941 and within the month of August had regained the old 1939 borders.
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The Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, FM Mannerheim swore to "liberate" Karelia on 10 JUL 41. But the Soviet defenses stiffened, and by the autumn of 1941 the stalemate in the north was becoming obvious.
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By December 1942 the offensive in eastern Karelia had ground to a halt. The Finnish Army had lost 75,000 troops out of a force of no more than 550,000. The northern war then settled into a grim static slog for the next two and a half years.
Finland has typically been well thought of in American lore for it's "plucky" defense in 1939. The Continuation War is usually forgotten. And, broadly speaking, of the Axis powers Finland was probably the least-objectionable other than the hapless Italians. It remained a democracy. And it refused to participate in the extermination programs of Nazi Germany. The total number of Finnish Jews known to have been murdered for their parentage was eight.
But the Finns are a hard people, and the Finnish record is not spotless.
The temporary rulers of East Karelia were determined to ethnically cleanse the Russians living there. Some were expelled, as many as a third were interned in camps, almost all women, children, and old people. The Wiki entry reads:
"The winter of 1941–1942 was hard for the Finnish urban population due to poor harvests and a shortage of agricultural laborers. However, for the interned it was disastrous and over 3,500 of them died, mostly from famine. The figure was equivalent to 13.8% of the inmates, where the corresponding figure for the free population of the occupied territories was 2.6% and for Finland proper 1.4%"The Russians have not forgotten this, those that still live in the Karelian region, and like as not they have not forgiven it, either.
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In January 1944 the Soviet Leningrad Front had forced the German and Finnish forces back, finally ending the siege. With the road to Berlin becoming ever more visible Finland asked for peace terms in February, but the Eduskunta, the Finnish Parliament, wouldn't accept the harsh terms Stalin insisted on. Finland resolved to fight on, and Stalin's STAVKA resolved on an attack to knock the irritating little bastards out of the war.
Endgame 1944 - The Soviet Isthmian Offensive
This attack is known as the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive. The Leningrad Front would attack up the Karelian Isthmus, whilst the Karelian Front would cross the Svir River through Ladoga Karelia. Between the two army groups the Soviet forces would smash the Finnish forces in Karelia and move on Helsinki.
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This sloppy mess was defended by two corps up front; III AK (15th Division and 19th Brigade) and IV AK (10th and 2nd Divisions) with two infantry divisions 3rd and 18th, the Armored Division (Panssaridivisioona) and the Cavalry Division in reserve behind the VT-line or further west; a total of 6 infantry divisions and a separate brigade, an armored division, and a mounted infantry division.
Against this the Leningrad Front was going to hit the Finns with 24 rifle divisions; 21st Army with 15 divisions, and 23rd Army with 9 divisions. Included in the echelons-above-corps were 14 brigade-sized tank units and 11 assault-gun regiments - 852 armoured fighting vehicles included ISU-122, ISU-152 assault guns, and T34, T-70, and IS-2 tanks. Two artillery divisions from the STAVKA Reserve plus divisional artillery added up to 2,850 cannons and mortars. The Soviet 13th Air Army had about 1,500 aircraft. And to throw in makeweight there were the massive fortress and railway guns of the Leningrad defenses and the battleships of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet.
By comparison the effort north of Lake Ladoga was relatively meek; sixteen divisions of the 7th and 32nd Armies of the Karelian Front, with less than half the tank strength.
Here the Finnish defense had originally consisted of three Army Corps; II AK (1st, 4th, 6th, and 14th Infantry Divisions, 21st Infantry Brigade, and four separate battalions) V AK (11th and 17th Infantry Divisions, 20th Infantry Brigade), and VI AK (5th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Divisions, 15th Infantry Brigade, and seven separate battalions).
The thunder of massed artillery announced in traditional Soviet fashion that the Leningrad Front thought they were hard enough to give the isthmian lines a go.
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- The defenders used a combination of blocking positions and spoiling attacks to prevent the Soviet attacks from developing, and counterattacked immediately to prevent the Soviet troops from consolidating gains.
- Finnish radio intelligence was excellent, and Soviet communications security exceptionally poor. Several Soviet attacks were smashed inside their own line of departure due to careless commo procedures that compromised operational security.
- The Finnish had developed a truly exceptional command-and-control net for their artillery, allowing a single observer to coordinate fires from units across the defensive sector. As many as 200 cannons and mortars would be directed by one FO, resulting in truly shattering massed fires.
After almost two weeks of continuous fighting the KaJoKE units had lost 8,000 men killed or too wounded to fight. But the Soviets has lost over a quarter of their fighting vehicles and probably on the order of 20,000 casualties. The isthmian phase of the “fourth strategic strike” of 1944 was over.
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Perhaps the most critical element in the outcome of the next phase - the last phase - of the July battles around Lake Ladoga was the Finnish response to the success of the Soviet isthmus offensive. Finnish Army command ordered their forces north of the Lake to shorten their lines, and withdrew all of V Corps to bolster the lines to the south.
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And more importantly, both units stepped back from the 1942-43 lines to the so-called "PSS-line", and were authorized to fall back even further if pressed.
So, when the Soviet Karelian Front crossed the LD on 20/21 JUN it fell mostly on empty air. In the south the Finnish 5th Division conducted a delaying action against the Soviet 7th Army falling back to the PSS-lines on the Maaselkä isthmus between Lake Ladoga to the south and Lake Lake Ääninen (Onega to the Russians) to the north. To the north of Ääninen the Soviet 32nd Army pushed II Corps back as well, doing considerable damage as it did.
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Here, as on the Karelian isthumus, the combination of better fortifications, artillery and aerial coordination, and, probably, Soviet exhaustion and supply problems caused the offensive to slog to a stop on the Maaselkä front. Attacks and counterattacks ranged along the U-line from mid June to mid July without significant effect. STAVKA looked to the north to attempt to turn the Finnish defenses and threaten a strategic debacle.
Here the Finnish position was shaky; two divisions of the Soviet 32nd Army, 176th Rifle and 289th Rifle, were set on a single brigade (21st). The overwhelming numbers made even a delaying action precarious - at least once the Finnish brigade was nearly enveloped. By late June the 21st Brigade had been backed up nearly to the Ilomantsi area.
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The Finnish Army command knew this as well.
Now that the situation along the Karelian Isthmus had stabilized it transferred the Cavalry Brigade north to bolster II Corps. The two brigades (21st and Cavalry) were reinforced with two infantry battalions fro 14th Division to form Group Raappana, setting the stage for the engagement around Ilomantsi.
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In this case, however, we English-speakers have two significant difficulties.
On one side the records of the defense are largely in Finnish. Not an easy language, and barriered, as well, by the rather taciturn position of Finland as the most eastern-facing of the Scandinavian nations, many of the Finnish records are difficult to find in English without serious effort. And what is available online is often poorly translated or fragmentary.
On the other, the Soviet records are still in the archives constructed by the old Soviet Union, whose purpose was not nearly so much to record history as to use it as a way to make the Soviet Union look good. The post-Soviet Russian archivists are said to be only slightly more forthcoming than they were when their pay notes featured Lenin on the front.
While researching this post I noted that very few of the online sources contain information from both Finnish and Soviet records. The most comprehensive appears to be the Wiki entry for the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk Offensive. Interestingly, the little website for the military hobby wargame "Flames of War" has some nice background pages, including this one discussing the Karelian operations of 1944.
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There are several items of interest available on the internet for an English-speaker, particularly this 2008 translation of a 1947 doctoral dissertation by one Knut Pipping. This work, "The Infantry Company as a Society", is primarily concerned with soldier group and individual behavior. But Pipping also served as section sergeant for a machinegun platoon in the 12th Infantry Regiment through the entire Continuation War period, and does a nice job of describing the daily lives of the ordinary jalkaväki during this time.
One recent examination of the engagement that looks promising is Pasi Tuunainen's "The Battle of Encirclement at Ilomantsi in July-August 1944—An Example of the Application of the Idea of Cannae in the Finnish Art of War" in the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, v. 19, issue 1. It's available here but costs $34, which is a little steep for me. A serious student of the battle, however, would seem to do well to investigate this material both for its accessibility and its discussion of the engagement in its historical context.
The Engagement: The fight at Ilomantsi has been called the "last work of the motti-master", and so we should probably first stop and discuss what this odd Finnish art was and how it was performed.
A motti is, literally, one cubic meter of cut wood. Finnish and Swedish woodcutters would fell and trim their logs and then stack them to be picked up later. So a "motti" in Finnish military slang was a larger enemy unit cut up into fragments for ease of destruction.
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And the Finland of the Forties was still a largely rural nation. Even Finnish draftees were more familiar with their woods and swamps than the Soviet conscripts they fought, and their Army trained specifically for fighting in the boreal forests.
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Soviet attacks then tended to be channelized down whatever roads or tracks the reconnaissance elements could find. Even if the Soviet unit commanders had a map - and many didn't - the Soviet topographic engineers were few and generally underresourced when present. So the Soviets were often unsure of there their enemies were, and just as often unsure even of where their own flanking elements were.
The Finnish Army was surprised by the mottis they created in 1939; they thought that the Soviets, when defeated, would run, and were not actually pleased finding these knotty little groups of Russians that had to be reduced. Finnish troopers noted that the individual Russian soldier was usually good at digging in, and even though the "mottiryssä" were no longer able to contribute much to the tactical advantage of their forces they seldom collapsed and nearly always had to be reduced by assault.
Neither of the Soviet rifle divisions attacking Ilomantsi had fought in the Winter War, so they had to learn the hard way what happened when you attacked Finns on ground of their choosing without overwhelming strength.
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STAVKA attempted to relieve the encircled units by throwing a division-sized naval unit down the Kuolismaa-Leppävaara road. The attacks, which were unsupported by significant armor or artillery, did nothing.
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If Stalin was anything he was a ruthless pragmatist. He had no need for a Finnish client state so long as the Finns could be made harmless.
In Finland the successful defense of Karelia was almost no victory. The Finnish Army had been mishandled badly in the opening weeks of the fourth strategic offensive, and overall had lost 60,000 men dead in the three years of the Continuation War, and for nothing. The total casualties for the war, about a quarter million, were about six and a half percent of the Finnish people. And equivalent loss in the U.S. of 2011 would come to some two million total, nearly 500,000 dead, the sort of bloodletting we have not seen since our Civil War.
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President Ryti would need to be the first to go - he had signed a pact with Hitler that Finland would not seek a separate peace with the Soviets. Marshal Mannerheim was appointed to replace him.
Fighting ended in Karelia in early September, and on 19 SEP 1944 Finland and the Soviet Union signed an armistice agreement.
The critical element of this agreement was that Finland avoided a Soviet occupation. She had to demobilize pretty much all of her Army, cede some fairly substantial chunks of eastern Finland, including the battlefields of Karelia and the city of Viipuri/Vyborg, to the Soviets, and pay a sizeable reparation.
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"So many of them, and so few of us."
He chews for a moment more and adds glumly;
"How will we ever manage to bury them all?"
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11 comments:
Another good post Chief, especially considering how little information there is in English about the Winter and Continuation wars.
Good work Chief!
It really is amazing how well the Fins handled the diplomacy at the end of WWII.
I have sometimes thought it would have been better for Canada to have been neutral (with a treaty saying the USA could intervene in case of invasion a la Finland) rather than have Canada being a card carrying member of NATO.
Leon: I meant to note that even the Wiki entry for this shows clear signs of having been translated from, I think, Finnish.
The problem with the lack of neutral assessment is that the old enemies still disagree strongly over the events and interpretation of the events of 1939-1944; check out the Wiki "discussion page" for almost any of the battles mentioned here. Huge arguments over who won, who lost, who met their objectives and who didn't...
Ael: I honestly don't understand what Canada gets out of NATO. Maybe it helps the Forces get cooperation from the Pentagon. But the degree to which Canada has been dragged into fights they have no real use for because of the close association with the U.S. would irk the hell out of me if I was Canadian. It still ticks me that the Airborne Regiment ended up getting disbanded because of the nonsense in Somalia, a place they never should have been...
Good post Chief. I was fairly familiar with the Winter War campaign at the start of the war, considerably less so with the Continuation War.
And an interesting set of battles to analyse. After a shaky start the Finns did what they do best and what we would expect after the Winter War; use their advantages, use the terrain.
The Soviets are the interesting factor here as they learnt some lessons but completely forgot others: appearing to take no chances on the Leningrad front but doing the exact same thing again (but with feeling?) further north. Why did they not put the whole offensive beyond doubt, give it the resources and direction it needed? The Soviets certain weren't short of them at that point in the war.
DF: I think the keys are timing and location.
First, by midsummer things in the Byelorussia and eastern Poland were heating up, and all STAVKA eyes were on Operation Bagration and the destruction of Army Group Center.
And second, once the Finns had been pushed away from Leningrad the rest was all gravy. The sideshow in Karelia wasn't all that important, and it showed.
And, I should add, the Soviets were like that; brilliance side-by-side with idiocy, competence with incompetence. They got used to the idea that they could solve military problems by throwing stuff and bodies at them. When they had overwhelming strength that worked, as in did in the opening weeks of the "fourth strategic strike". But when they didn't, a smart enemy could use tactics and terrain against them, as Raapana and his guys did.
Strange place, the Soviet Union. If we ever really get a good look inside it I think we'll find it was more bizarre than we every suspected...
Regarding NATO, my view (as a Canuckian) of Canada being in NATO is due to our inferiority complex. As a nation, we're constantly hand-wringing about our national identity (and sometimes if we even possess one) and trying to differentiate us from the US (I think part of the anti-US sentiment originates from that). Joining NATO was our chance of saying "see, we're important to the world!" Of course, this is all my unresearched, speaking out of my buttocks opinion.
Leon: I suspect you're right. The prospect of being left out of the Big Fat Hairy Atlantic Charter Defense Boy's Club would have been a real kick in the pants for the pols who wanted to think of their nation as one of the global Playas.
The thing I have always respected the Finns for is their appreciation for being a little nation and what it takes to be a successful little nation. They're not a doormat - their fighting prowess in WW2 proved that - but they don't try and run with the big boys, either. They recognized the power of their monstrous neighbor as well as its monstrosity, and knew that if they really wanted to - i.e., if the Finns were ever too much trouble to leave alone - that the Sovs could swallow them up. But that the prospective indigestion was bad enough to keep the bear in its cave so long as the Finns used their heads and walked carefully, which they did.
They and the Swiss are my idea of sane, sensible little nations, and I hope that the Finns appreciate that. I know that many U.S. conservatives don't - witness the moronic comments on the recent Norwegian whacko rampage as reflection that the Scandanavians in general and the Norse in particular haven't been full-gonzo crazy enough about Islamophobia...
Nicely done, Chief.
The only thing I can add is about the terrain. I'm pretty familiar with Northern MN and the UP and there's one small detail you didn't mention.
In both locations the ground that isn't swampy tends to be very hard rock. Minnesota's Iron Range and the UP's Porcupine mountains both had glaciers a mile high sitting on them and didn't get worn down near as much as the surrounding terrain.
This could have made things considerably harder on the Russians as their standard tactics were to dig in when attacked. Their foxholes would either have been full of water or less than an inch deep. Either way, they would not be optimal for fighting.
Pluto: My understanding is that SOP for both sides was to build log bunkers above ground - it was probably that combination of hard ground and high water that made digging in deep impractical.
I don't know how thrilled I would have been to have had to fight over this terrain. It looks pretty miserable to me. But then, I'm not a native...
Howdy Chief,
I've been rather enjoying your blog for the last couple of days. You're interested in the identities of the Soviet commanders and I'm able to help you with this.
The Karelian front was under the command of Kirill Meretskov, whom you have identified already. Russian-language sources give his rank as general of the army (you described him as Col-Gen.), he received a promotion to marshal of the Soviet Union shortly afterwards. Of course, this means the Stavka was satisfied with the overall conduct of the campaign.
The commander of the 32nd Army was Lt-Gen. Filipp Gorelenko ("general-leytenant").
The divisional commanders were as follows:
176th - Col. Zolotaryov
289th - Maj-Gen. Tchernuha
Some brief notes on the settlement.
The three primary demands advanced by Stalin were:
* restoration of borders to 1940 Moscow treaty boundaries
* internment of all remaining German forces by the Finnish army until April war
* reparations to the amount of US$600 mln to be paid within 5 years
It was the subject of reparations that proved to be the sticking point in the negotiations, as the Finnish government did not believe the figure was realistic given the scale of the Finnish economy. The figure was reduced to $300 million to be paid in goods rather than currency over a period of 6 years. The Soviet occupation was avoided, however the USSR reserved rights to move military units through Finnish terriroty. Another key demand was the lift of the ban on the Finnish Communist Party - an influential force on the Finnish left and an interesting historic subject in itself as a Comintern-affiliated party in an unaligned liberal-democratic capitalist state.
The consequences of the settlement were more far-reaching that a simple peace settlement. Until the end of the Soviet Union Finland had to negotiate a tight-rope course of neutrality between its western and eastern neighbours. It was one of the few foreign destinations open to Soviet citizens, as Finland diligently returned all fleeing dissidents or would-be refugees. Other policy has been similarly circumspect with regards to Moscow's wishes.
This allows me to nicely segue into a follow-up question for you. In your opinion, what is the last successful war waged by the US in terms of broad political objectives achieved?
Of course, no-one could dispassionately analyse Afghanistan as a victory and the withdrawal from Iraq seems to be little better than Vietnam. Desert Storm '91 doesn't really count, since Saddam claimed it as a victory and Bush Jr. had to come back for a do-over. I suspect the invasion of Panama in '89 was the last truly successful military action. I think the subject may make a good post, but I'd be just as happy with a couple of brief comments.
Anton: Thank you for the information! As you can see, it's been added to the post.
Now, as to your question: "In your opinion, what is the last successful war waged by the US in terms of broad political objectives achieved?"
I would tend to agree that the last military action that the U.S. initiated that produced a political end-state the was an overall/generally accepted "positive" was Panama 1989. That with the caveat the in a lot of ways all that action did was undo a lot of the political problems that the U.S. had created in Panama by creating the sort of conditions that allowed the Noriega regime to do as well as it had for so long; so the "win" in that sense was no more than undoing the Latin American problems that the U.S. had itself largely created.
In terms of a real WAR - as opposed to just a limited military action - I'd argue that you'd have to go back as far as Korea, and many would argue that the end result there was not particularly "favorable". But restoring the intra-Korean border was the announced goal of U.S. policy, it was achieved and is still in effect today. So, win.
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