Showing posts with label naval policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label naval policy. Show all posts

Saturday, April 16, 2022

Naval makeover! (cruiser-to-submarine edition)

 The cruiser Москва has passed on.


He is no more. 

(Russian naval vessels are by tradition "he's" rather than the "she's" of English or American sailor tradition) 

He has ceased to be, expired and gone to meet his maker. Bereft of life, he rests in peace, has shuffled off his mortal coil, rung down the curtain and joined the choir invisible.

Okay.

Rule #1 of war is "Shit happens", and the fact that this vessel is now full of water is not in itself either shocking or particularly interesting. 

If one was in a snarky mood one might make the same sort of observation Bismarck might have made about continental powers like Germany or Russia wanting (let alone "needing") large capital ships: "...the fuck?" (only in the original German, of course...). 

If one was in a snarky mood.

To me there are two interesting parts about this, though.

The first is that the Russian official line is that the cruiser was lost "under tow in heavy seas after an internal ammunition explosion". 

Not because nasty enemy missiles turned him into a flaming pyre, no, no! Just your basic head-on-collision-twenty-car pileup of fucked-up munitions handling and/or storage, piss-poor damage control, and incompetent seamanship.

I kind of get the dictator-grade level of "not wanting to admit that your enemy hurt you" propaganda. But to want to make the story "our sailors are lethally incompetent" seems...a bit louche' at best. Tell me...how does that make things in your navy sound...better?

Now, that said; damage control at sea is goddamn hard. It requires constant, repetitive, realistic training led by good petty officers and planned and overseen by competent and demanding officers.

Even the best navies have their bad days; we saw that back in 2015 when we talked about the loss of HIJMS Taiho during the Battle of the Philippine Sea

The 日本海軍 Nippon Kaigun - the Imperial Japanese Navy - was one of the best-led (at the tactical level, at least...) and best-trained in the world in 1944. But that didn't prevent the sinking of one of their newest carriers because of poor damage control after a single torpedo strike.

On the other end of the military scale, though? Damage control is one of those massive-training-fail issues that seems to be endemic in "gangster" military organizations. Think Idi Amin's or Saddam's "armies" if you want a model. 

If nothing else this Russo-Ukrainian War has done a pretty good job of throwing a nastily bright light on exactly how fucking brutally bad the Russian armed services are. As bad as the Ugandans or the Iraqis.

Turns out that when your national model is "kleptocracy" your national military is just about as good as you'd expect based on that. 

When your soldiers and sailors are "led" by people - from petty officers and NCOs through general officers to their political masters - whose whole mode of thought is "steal what you can, neglect what you can't, and lie about everything to everyone both above and below you"  and those troops are either not trained for shit (or completely untrained) and their "leaders" are often incompetent, either because the system is designed to ensure the leaders are piss-poor, or unable to demand they aren't, to find that the entire organization those soldiers and sailors are part of ends up being criminally incompetent at the difficult business of war, including the difficult task of naval damage control, should hardly be shocking.

If you choose shitty crooks to "lead" you, you shouldn't be shocked when they "lead" you into shitty crookedness. 

Which leads me back from the shores of Ukraine to the shores of North America.

Because you'd think that this sort of military clusterfuckery would be a cautionary tale for those of us here on the sidelines in the United States about the whole business of being all enthusiastic for dictators because, say, they hate homosexuals and you do, too. That getting your dream of "leaders" hating on liberal soy-boys and darkies and uppity women isn't worth the sort of incompetent "leadership" that ends up getting your sailors killed and their capital ships sunk. 

Even for the most foaming-mouthed-rabid MAGAt groupies of Tubby and his crooked little weasel pals.

But, no.

They won't believe that.

Ever.

And that's a problem, a problem deeper than the bottom of the Black Sea, where the Москва now rests.



Friday, February 08, 2019

Ruling the Waves..?

Rob Farley has a post up at the National Interest discussing the current expansion of the PRC's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), comparing that to the Great Power navies of the past century.
He asks whether the PLAN can succeed in advancing the PRC's geopolitical ends compared to the Imperial German, Russian (and Soviet), Imperial Japanese, and United States navies.

It's not a bad little article, but I think it asks the wrong question.

I'd start, rather, with the question "Does (fill in the blank nation) need a blue-water navy?"

Two of the four examples Farley picks - Germany and Russia/the Soviet Union - were primarily continental powers and as such the answer seems obviously "No". As such their fleets were superfluous at best and, for Germany, disastrous at worst; dragging Wilhelmine Germany into a naval arms race with Great Britain that diverted resources that the Reich could have put to better use.

The "good cases" would seem to be the maritime empires, Japan and the U.S.; both depend on overseas trade, both are isolated by oceans, at least partially in the case of the U.S., both had, or have, imperial ambitions.

Oddly, Farley chooses to ignore two other great maritime empires.

The "success" is, obviously, the British. Britain obviously needed a blue-water navy, and, in general, did pretty well with it. Unsurprisingly that naval power disappeared with the Empire, but it had a hell of a good 400-odd-year run.

Spain, on the other hand, needed a fleet but always seemed to find its ambitions were greater than its capabilities. Someday I should really find a good Spanish naval history to understand why the Dons never managed to figure out what the British seemed to manage so effortlessly. But clearly, lacking a fleet capable of long-range power projection helped doom the Spanish colonial empire, whether from foreign enemies like the U.S. or from colonial revolt.
So.

Looking at the historical examples, and the current geopolitical needs of China, I can't really see how putting time, money, and effort into a big fleet helps them.

Anyone willing to take the counterpoint?

Let's discuss.

Friday, August 05, 2016

Bell-bottom trousers, coats of navy blue...

About the only thing that makes me laugh harder than wing-wipers all decked out in camouflage outfits is when squids do it.
I mean, those cammie suits'll make you SO hard to see on that ginormous fucking hunk of steel out in the in a fucking hole in the water, right?

What, blue cotton shirts and dungarees too much not-like-a-video-game for ya, Navy? They worked just fine when grandpap went out to sink the Imperial Japanese Navy.


I think what irks me about this nonsense is what some of the other waitstaff over at MilPub have complained about; that this isn't what services at war do, and, at least in theory the armed services are out fighting in various less-paved portions of the world even if the nation as a whole (outside of Victor Davis Hanson's prion-disease-addled brain) isn't. This also, IMO, isn't what services with a better grasp of their actual mission do; this is an artifact that ISTM that our armed services are infected with something that you see a lot if you look around the United States - that it's "better to look good than be good".

I realize that this is an extreme effect of selective observational bias, but...to me the impact of all this fussing about appearance give the impression that We the People (and We the Armed Forces) care if you are terrific at something only if it gets out there in the news, or into social media.

Oh, and the solution to the USN's cammie-pant problem?

Put all the gobs in GREEN cammie outfits.

FFS, people. You're fucking sailors!
Why not be proud to look like 'em?

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

Tennoheika Banzai!

The proposed cover art for the Aoshima 1/700 scale model kit of the Japan Naval Self-Defense Force vessel Hyuga:


Note the sinking PLAN carrier Liaoning in the background! Clearly "Operation Senkaku" was a devastating success for the JNSDF and the East China Sea is now an Imperial lake. Poor deluded Rob Farley, clearly baffled by Imperial propaganda, claims
"Obviously there’s been some sort of dreadful accident– apparently near the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands– and the Hyuga is rendering desperately needed assistance to the Chinese ship. Those Ospreys are undoubtedly rescuing scores of Chinese crewmen. I can only hope that the goodwill and generosity evident in this artwork helps serve as a bridge between the two great East Asian nations."
Ha! Foolish Yankee, you won't be so cheerful when California has become part of the New Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere!

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Avast, Comrade!

Robert Farley discusses the question of sea-lane control facing the delightfully named People's Liberation Army Navy.
"China faces a very basic set of maritime problems. The PRC draws its most important resources from across an ocean that it cannot control, and exports most of its finished goods to overseas partners who similarly lay beyond the reach of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Whether or not the PLAN can deter or defeat the U.S. Navy (USN) in China’s littoral, the organization’s true test lies in its ability to secure the PRC’s critical lines of communication."
I link to the article here not so much as a recommendation of Farley's analysis but as a conversation starter.



Much has been made recently of the U.S. "turn east"; renewed interest in and contemplation of the situation along the West Pacific littoral as well as curiosity over the PRC's intentions regarding her maritime "near abroad". Farley comes to what I would consider the "textbook" conclusion:
"...by skipping ahead the PLAN has left itself bereft of the kind of low cost, medium size platforms that can support sea control operations at a distance from home. The lack of these sea control platforms (or suitable alternatives) will leave the PLAN at a serious disadvantage when and if it needs to protect lines of communication in unfriendly environments. Liaoning can only operate in one place at a time, and only for a limited time period. The PLAN might have been better served by adopting the more evolutionary Soviet approach to naval aviation."
But I guess my question here would be; why would the PLAN really need much naval aviation at all?



The PRC, although more "maritime" today than at nearly any period in her history, is still largely a continental power. One of the reasons she has been so interested in central Asia is securing access to Afghan natural gas, Iranian and Pakistani oil, and similar petroleum resources in the former Soviet 'stans.

She also has to consider what her naval options are. To attempt to compete with the USN and its likely allies' naval airpower would require a 1914-Kriegsmarine-like naval race complete with a fairly significant aircraft and shipbuilding program. But what if, instead, the PLAN could concentrate in sinking the USN's carrier platforms? What if, instead, China concentrated on sea-denial, depending on deterrence to keep the enemy airstrikes away from its merchies? What if her submarine force became, in effect, the "escort carriers" of the US-China Pacific War, chasing off and sinking the US carriers much as the CVEs did the U-boats of 1944? And what, if anything, should the U.S. and the USN do about that?

(Mind you - the FIRST thought that occurs to me is "Don't get involved in a war with China", so there's that...)

Thoughts?

(Oh, and as we know, the Taiwanese aren't worried. Because they have mastered Decepticon technology...)


Update 3/28: As a counter to the Farley piece, here's Jim Holmes over at The Diplomat arguing that the increased range of modern aircraft actually makes the expense and technical complexity of carrier aviation a greater liability than you'd think:
"First, if future combat aircraft boast ranges measured in thousands of miles, it's worth asking at what point navies can dispense with mobile airfields altogether. UCAVs could operate from strategically placed islands or landmasses abutting important theaters — in effect converting land into an unsinkable aircraft carrier. Persuading allies to host air bases that might expose them to attack could prove tricky. Still, it's worth asking what a world without carriers would look like."
Hmmm.

Monday, December 31, 2012

Decisive Battles: Barents Sea 1942

Battle of the Barents Sea Date: 31 DEC 1942


Forces Engaged: United Kingdom (Royal Navy) - Escorts of Convoy JW51B, which consisted of:

6 destroyers:
HMS Achates (A-Class destroyer, 2 x 4.7" cannon, 4 x 21" torpedo tubes),
HMS Orwell (O-class destroyer, 4 x 4" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),
HMS Oribi (O-class destroyer, 4 x 4" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),
HMS Onslow (O-class destroyer, 4 x 4" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),


HMS Obedient (O-class destroyer, 4 x 4" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes) and
HMS Obdurate (O-class destroyer, 4 x 4" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes)

2 Flower-class corvettes:
HMS Rhododendron (1 x 4" cannon) and
HMS Hyderabad (1 x 4" cannon)

1 minesweeper HMS Bramble (2 x 4" cannon)

2 armed trawlers Vizalma and Northern Gem (I have no details on the armament of these vessels but typically they were lightly armed, with a single 3" or 4" cannon, if that)

After three hours this force was reinforced by two light cruisers from the "Force R" squadron assigned to general convoy escort duty on the Barents passage: HMS Sheffield (Town Class, 12 x 6" cannon) and HMS Jamaica (Crown Colony-class light cruiser, 12 x 6" cannon)

The convoy itself consisted of 14 merchant vessels carrying 2046 vehicles, 202 tanks, 87 fighters, 33 bombers, 11,500 tons fuel, 12,650 tons aviation fuel, and 54,321 tons general cargo to the Soviet Union.

The escort commander was CAPT R. St.V. Sherbrooke RN aboard HMS Onslow.

Germany (Deutsches Kriegsmarine) -

1 large protected cruiser ("pocket battleship"):
KM Lützow (Deutschland-class cruiser, 6 x 11" cannon)


1 heavy cruiser:
KM Admiral Hipper (Admiral Hipper-class cruiser, 8 x 8" cannon)

6 destroyers:
KM Frederich Echholdt (1934A-class destroyer, 5 x 5" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),
KM Richard Beitzen (1934-class destroyer, 5 x 5" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),
KM Theodor Riedel (1934-class destroyer, 5 x 5" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),
KM Z 29 (1936A-class "Narvik" destroyer, 4 x 5.9" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),
KM Z 30 (1936A-class "Narvik" destroyer, 4 x 5.9" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes),
KM Z 31 (1936A-class "Mob" destroyer, 5 x 5.9" cannon, 8 x 21" torpedo tubes)

1 (possibly 2) x submarines:
U-354 (Type VIIC submarine, 5 x 21-inch torpedo tubes)
(Note: There seems to be some question regarding how many and which U-boats were in the Barents Sea that day. I've read several sources that state that two submarines were on station shadowing the convoy. U-354 is mentioned by name in the Wiki entry but no mention of a second submarine occurs in that source. The History Learning Site page doesn't name any of the German subs, but states; "Sherbrooke had been kept well informed of German radio traffic and he knew that a U-boat was ahead of the convoy with another one stationed to the south of it."

The Naval Weapons site also specifies U-354, does not mention the position of a second U-boat, but then goes on to list the U-626 as part of the German order of battle. The problem with that, however, is that this U-boat is supposed to have been sunk fifteen days earlier by the USCGC Ingham.

So, I suspect that there WAS a second U-boat on the scene that day, but have no idea which vessel it was; any help with this issue would be greatly appreciated!)
the surface force under the command of Vice-Admiral Oskar Kummetz with his flag in KM Admiral Hipper

The Sources: The usual well documented modern records from both sides, as well as numerous secondary sources.

Several good places for information in the internet include the History Learning Site entry for the engagement, a terrific entry on the "Naval Weapons" site covering the action and including the order of battle for both sides. The Wiki entry also does a good job summarizing the engagement and the larger context of the northern convoy battles in WW2.

Naval History has a terrific couple of pages on the action, including some great battle maps which I have freely looted for this post. The modern Kriegsmarine has a nice little web page covering the engagement, too.

The Campaign: Hopefully I don't have to explain the context of the northern convoy battles to you.

The bottom line is that the Soviet Union got valuable materials through the UK-to-Murmansk convoys but as much as the equipment was useful to the Soviets the very act of providing it was essential to binding Stalin to the Western Allies.

Short of a Second Front on the European mainland - which just wasn't going to happen in 1942, regardless of the political pressures - the Arctic convoys were a vital tangible commitment by Britain and, later, the U.S., to providing some degree of skin to the game in the East.


As for this particular engagement, the Kriegsmarine page does a good job of summing up the particulars at stake that New Year's Eve seventy years ago today:
"...we have to consider the dilemma confronting Hitler at a time when his Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army were surrounded at Stalingrad. The Soviets were counting heavily on materiel from the west which could be supplied only through a treacherous sea route through the Barents Sea into Murmansk.

During the summer, the edge of the ice pack retreated to 300 miles from the North Cape of Norway, so convoys could pass well clear of a coastline dotted with German air bases. But the long summer days also made them vulnerable to u-boat attack.

Conversely, in winter when ice-free waters narrowed to 150 miles and the days were short, the u-boat danger was lessened but air attacks became more frequent.

The Luftwaffe had been successful in sinking large numbers of Allied merchantmen in the turbulent, icy waters of the Barents Sea. But now Field Marshal Hermann Göring’s dwindling number of fighters and bombers were urgently needed on the eastern front in support of the attempted Stalingrad breakout.

Russian re-supply would have to be crushed by the Nazi surface and undersea fleet if it was going to be done at all. And winter was the time to do it."
The other major political factor in this engagement was the question for Germany of "What is this fucking Navy for, anyway?"

Hitler had been a grunt in WW1, when the German Emperor had amassed a fleet with the explicit design of challenging the Royal Navy in the close waters of northern Europe.

It is unlikely that Hitler the grunt had any better understanding in 1917 of the military-political pressures that led to the stalemate in the North Sea than Hitler the supreme commander did in 1942.

But it didn't stop him from second-guessing his naval leadership.

Again, the Kriegsmarine site does a neat job of summing up the strategic situation of the German Navy at the end of 1942:
"Because of some British commando landings in Norway he (Hitler) became convinced that the British planned to invade Norway and that Sweden would then join forces with Russia and trap his land forces in a gigantic pincer move. For years he had railed against his surface ship fleet...often referring to it as a useless liability, (however) he was placing an inordinate confidence in its ability to crush any Allied attempt to invade Norway or re-supply the Russians."
Hitler was also fiercely (in a sort of carpet-chewing-nutzo Hitlerian way) freakish about losing capital ships.

He hated the notion that he would have to lose any of them to gain some military objective, and so his infatuation with what today in the U.S. military we'd call "force protection" permeated his naval staff.

He wanted the gains without the risk, and this thinking dominated his and his Navy's employment of their surface forces.

So on the morning of 31 DEC 1942 the target of the Kriegsmarine's sortie was the Arctic convoy JW-51B, just another of the conveyor belt of vessels sailing the fringe of the polar seas on the way to or from the Soviet port of Murmansk.


The convoy was in line-ahead because of the danger of drifting ice roughly 230 miles from the North Cape when U-354 made the day's sighting. It's indicative of Hitler's fixation about his surface Navy that the orders to sortie the Lützow-Hipper group had to come directly from the Navy CINC, Raeder, himself.

In particular it's worth noting that the sortie orders include the following phrase as a Fuhrer Directive: “Procedure on meeting the enemy is to avoid a superior force, otherwise destroy according to established protocol”

Now don't get me wrong; I get that it isn't smart for an armed force to deliberately engage a stronger force when there's no greater strategic gain in doing so. But the Kriegsmarine took this directive to extremes, refusing to engage even when on relatively even terms as we'll see in a bit.

Mind you, the Kriegsmarine operational plans for engaging convoys were simple and appear to be effective. The sortie group would separate prior to approaching the target convoy; the pocket battleship Lützow and her escorts to the south, the cruiser Admiral Hipper and escorts to the north.

The Hipper group would attack first to draw the escorts and force the convoy to turn away, into the guns of the Lützow. The Hipper would massacre the escorts, the Lützow would butcher the merchies, easy peasy lemon squeezy.

But as we know, no plan survives contact with the enemy, so it shouldn't be a shock that starting at about 8:30am local time things began to go seriously wrong in the dark polar day.

The Engagement: The first intimation that the British convoy escorts had that they were going to have a busy day was when lookouts aboard HMS Hyderabad, leading the convoy to the southeast, reported two destroyer-type vessels on the western horizon.


The corvette's captain had been advised that Soviet destroyers were en route to link up with the convoy, so he took no action. HMS Obdurate's commander was more curious, however, and when he sighted the ships a bit later he turned towards them, signaled a challenge and received not a password, but gunfire.

The British escorts were well-drilled and took immediate action; four destroyers (HMS Onslow, Obdurate, Obedient and Orwell) turned towards the enemy ships while HMS Achates began to lay down a smokescreen, which included black smoke from her funnels and white smoke from "smoke floats", some sort of floating smudge pot.

For about thirty minutes the British escorts and the German northern force closed the range. At the same time the British were broadcasting a "surface action" alarm that detached the two cruisers from Force R towards their location.

At 9:00am the escort commander's lookouts identified a capital ship with the German forces as the Admiral Hipper, a vessel seven times the size of the O-class destroyers and whose 8-inch cannons both outranged their smaller guns as well as delivered projectiles capable of sinking the British destroyers with a single well-placed hit.

At about 9:30am Hipper opened fire, her target HMS Achates silhouetted against her own smokescreen. Within several minutes the cruiser's fire had crippled the British ship and the Hipper shifted fire to HMS Onslow and HMS Orwell.


Weather conditions that day helped the British defenders, with much low-lying haze and sea-smoke, and numerous snow squalls. The Kriegsmarine web page notes that "(t)he dazzle camouflage patterns of British ships sometimes made them easier to spot but in this circumstance it worked to their distinct advantage. Gunners aboard the Hipper had difficulty in finding targets in the dappled gray haze and the superiority of British fire-control radar was now making a difference."

What didn't help the German attackers was their own dread of combat loss. VADM Kummetz kept turning the Hipper away from the British escorts in fear of torpedo attacks.

His combat log for this part of the action reads: “Only quick action can solve the problem of danger from torpedo attacks and this has to be considered in the light of my orders not to take any serious risks.”

Had he closed on the British escorts he might have made short work of them...but he might also had suffered a lucky hit from a shell or torpedo that might have crippled his cruiser and left him helpless and swarmed over by the British light vessels. He chose caution and in so doing forfeited his chance for a decisive success.

As it was, however, the attack of the Hipper group was having the effect desired in the tactical plan - the convoy was turning away south.

By about 11am the situation on the north side of the convoy looked about like this:

HMS Achates was continuing to screen the retiring merchies but was in increasing distress. She would sink at 1315, with only 80 survivors taken off by one of the trawlers.

Hipper and the two destroyers, Orwell and Onslow, continued to trade fire, most of it ineffective due to a combination of weather, including savage icing that caused ammunition and propellant charges to freeze to their racks and cannon breeches to stick open or closed. Finally, however, the heavier weight of the cruiser's battery began to tell on HMS Onslow:
"One hit shattered a surface radar antenna and caused thousands of splinters to pepper the bridge. One struck Sherbrooke in the head, smashing a cheekbone and causing his left eye to hang loose from its socket. For a few moments no one on the bridge knew of his injury because he kept giving orders in an even voice."
Sherbrooke, by the way, was awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions that day.

Not sure whether that was worth an eye, but, there.

The Hipper was also trading ineffective fire with HMS Obedient when the two cruisers from Force R turned up some time about 11ish. Their fire, especially Sheffield's, was immediately effective, getting several "straddles" (rounds falling both over and short of the target) before scoring three hits in succession.


VADM Kummetz's force turned away, made smoke, and in a short time had ordered his entire squadron to withdraw at speed.


At this point - about 1130 - one of those bizarre incidents that happen fairly regularly in war took place. The officer commanding (and, one assumes, the lookouts and several other officers as well) two German destroyers, the Friedrich Eckholdt and the Richard Beitzen, somehow mistook HMS Sheffield and HMS Jamaica for his own capital ships.

(How the hell you mistake this:
for this:
I got no idea, but then, that's war; fucked up things happen all the time. Fear, confusion, bad weather, inattention...anything can get you killed and usually does)

For whatever reason the two destroyers steered toward the British cruisers who appear to have been well aware of the identity of the approaching vessels.

When the British opened up on the two the Eckholdt was hit directly amidships and sunk within less than two minutes with the loss of all 325 sailors aboard her.


The Beitzen escaped untouched.

While they were thus pounding the piss out of the hapless Eckholdt the British cruisers lost track of the Hipper, who was slipping away west to link up with the southern force.

That force, meanwhile, had sighted the convoy and opened fire at about 5,000 yards. Lützow - whose 11-inch main battery had a maximum range of over 26,000 yards - managed to shoot a total of 87 (eighty-seven!) 11" and 75 (seventy-five!) 6" rounds without scoring a single hit.


As an artilleryman even given the poor weather and unstable gun-platform conditions I'm impressed with that as a sort of pinnacle of indirect fire clusterfuckery. Serious; it takes a real gift to shoot that poorly. The result was that when the order to withdraw came the pocket battleship ended up with a massive bolo on her record sheet.

The German force withdrew to the west and then south. The British had lost a destroyer, HMS Achates, and the minesweeper HMS Bramble (which had been sunk by the Eckholdt as she returned to the convoy's position from sweeping up straggling merchies earlier that morning) and about 250 matelots; not a single merchant vessel was lost from this convoy either that day or before it docked in Murmansk other than one that ran around on the way into harbor.

The German force lost the destroyer Eckholdt and a handful of sailors aboard Hipper, perhaps 350 all tolled.

And that was that. Or, at least, that was all for the shooting war. What happened next, though, was rather more important.

The Outcome: Tactical British victory with strategic implications for German naval operations.

The Impact: Again, the Kriegsmarine site sums up the impact of this engagement nicely:
"Ironically, Admiral Kummetz’s Operation Rainbow tactic had worked. The Hipper had served as a decoy to attract the escorts and the convoy had then turned southward directly into the path of the pocket battleship Lützow, just as expected.

But both German heavyweights were timidly fought, although it must be admitted that they had been hampered by periods of poor visibility. As he retreated toward the naval base at Altenfjord, KAPT Stänge (of Lützow) noted sadly in his war diary, “As we withdrew from the battle scene, it was hard to escape the feeling that, even though the situation appeared to be in our favor, we were unable to get at the convoy and scored no successes whatsoever.”

A combination of technical fuckups then made matters worse.

U-354 had transmitted a message reporting success at about noon the day of the engagement, a not-surprising result of viewing the entire action from a tiny submarine periscope.

The German surface squadron maintained radio silence en route to Norway and then, after their arrival, several transmission glitches prevented the after-actions report from arriving at Hitler's operational HQ in East Prussia until the afternoon the following day.

By that time Hitler had heard a BBC broadcast that cheerfully reported the Kriegsmarine's latest balls-up.

Not only was he furious at the defeat, Adolf interpreted the delay in his own Navy's reporting the defeat as either cowardly fear of, or insubordinate unwillingness to, report bad news.

The engagement spelled the effective end of the German surface ship navy. Raeder was forced out and replaced by the U-boat man, Doenitz. While the German capital ships largely evaded the scrapping that Hitler's New Year's Day tirade recommended they were finished as anything other than a force in being, effectively no different than the Kaiser's High Seas Fleet after Jutland.

The Battle of North Cape in 1944 was the only remaining time that a German capital ship would sail into deep water.


I think there are several lessons to be learned from this engagement.

First, and most important, is that a nation needs a way to coldly and clearsightedly assess its national interests and how military force can best be used - if possible - to achieve them.

Germany in the middle of the 20th Century was, as it had been for half a century, a continental European power. Its forays off the land mass of Europe were typically brief and almost always unprofitable.

A German government with a dispassionate view of its needs - even assuming that aggressive war was part of those needs - would have recognized that a large conventional Navy or, indeed, much of any sort of investment in naval force at all, was at best an indulgence and a luxury and at worst an antagonizing factor.

As the Kaiser had found out in 1914; any German Navy genuinely capable of projecting German power would have to be capable of defeating the Royal Navy on equal terms.

And any German Navy capable of defeating the Royal Navy on equal terms would immediately and inescapably be a reason for Great Britain to become Germany's enemy. And that would be a problem that would prove insoluble, both in 1917 and in 1942.

Because the insurmountable problem was Germany's geographic position relative to Great Britain; her fleet was automatically trapped within the close confines of the North Sea. Much as Russia and the later Soviets discovered, the lack of a confined (and in Russia's case, ice-free) port meant that any naval force would have to fight its way out of its own harbors before any attempt at blue-water command was possible. This problem would and did prove insoluble in practice.

Second, assuming that Germany had decided that a Navy WAS a valuable use of resources that Navy should have spent time thinking of what its geopolitical objective was as a blueprint for its design and construction.

To my view the German Navy of 1942 had no real strategic objective and hadn't since it's inception and it showed in both its organization and its tactics.

I don't really blame the Kriegsmarine leadership for missing the carrier revolution; many other more experienced naval thinkers and leaders did, too. But short of a full-on carrier-based force (a USN-circa-1944-type navy, then) the German fleet only had two real options;

It could try and be a blue-water strategic-ocean-control type force, similar to what the Hochseeflotte had been designed for in 1914. This would have entailed giving some thought to the strategic disadvantage inherent in the North Sea bottleneck, ways to break through that, and a fleet organization and tactics designed around it. The Kriegsmarine leadership doesn't show me signs of having ever thought that through.

Or - it could have been designed as an ocean-denial type force based on a plan for isolating the British Isles and continental European enemies from overseas sources of war materials. This would have been very possible; the USN had accomplished it against Japan by 1944. The problems of access to the open seas would still have been there, but, again, the German Navy seems to have been very reactive rather than proactive on this subject. A sea-denial force consisting of U-boats, light units, and an integrated air arm might have managed the military tasks needed from it; holding the Channel long enough for an invasion force to cross, cutting British oceanic supply lines, and denying the Royal Navy free use of the Med.

The U-boats did phenomenally well, especially when you compare their work to the IJN's I-boats that were technically equivalent to the German submarines. But overall the Kriegsmarine lost the U-boat war, too, and one main reason was that they never had another plan other than "sail 'em out and hope for the best".

They never solved the lethal combination of sonar and the escort carrier.


So I think that the Battle of the Barents Sea was just an exclamation point on the reality that the Kriegsmarine as constructed by Nazi Germany was a resource-sucking luxury and a foolish diversion

Assuming for the moment that NOT launching an aggressive war - not at all a settled question in my opinion - was not on the table in 1933 then the question "What would we use these ships for?" becomes a critical one in allocating national resources. Even more important would be the question "What do we need from the seas and oceans around us?"

In Germany's case the problems came down to issues of projecting power across sea barriers - invading Britain and control of the Mediterranean littoral - and cutting off war materials their enemies needed to bring in by sea.

As it turned out the Kriegsmarine was not well organized, or well handled, to accomplish either task, and the overall operational disconnect between the often-at-each-other's-throats German service branches didn't help.

Whatever the reasons, the effect was to sink millions of marks into a force that was dramatically ineffective at advancing Hitler's Germany's geopolitical aims regardless of what you think of those aims. Taken purely as a guide to military strategy, the Kriegsmarine of WW2 is a cautionary tale.

So, in short, although the engagement of New Year's Eve 1942 meant the beginning of the end, the end of the beginning was written into the Kriegsmarine almost from its Nazi rebirth.

It only remained to sink the floating wreckage in the frozen waters of the Barents Sea.

Monday, December 03, 2012

What's Mandarin for "Avast, ye scurvy dogs"..?

Fallows has been doing some spadework on geopolitics in the South China Sea and the People's Republic of China/Hainan Island People's Congress' latest statements regarding what they see as their rights in the littoral they consider their "near abroad".

And this "abroad" is at least to my eye pretty broad:
Look at the size of the East-is-Red line on the map above: I don't see any real way that historical claim, international, or maritime law could be twisted to support that reach of "territorial waters". That seems to me to be a hell of an over-reach.

Much as I don't agree with the commonly-heard U.S. conservative trope that places the PRC in the military cross-hairs as "our next enemy" this announcement does seem to me to be an unpleasant sort of geopolitical overreach from the Hainan government and makes me wonder what the hell the PRC was thinking to let this leak out. If "hard cases make bad law" then "making broad statements potentially applicable to nearly-impossible-to-enforce-maritime-territorial-claims makes dangerous foreign policy".

IF taken to the territorial extreme this claim would seem to give any ambitious, aggressive, or just-plain-batshit-crazy PLAN commander a ready made casus belli.
Mind you, there does seem to be a strong strain of opinion that this announcement is NOT intended to genuinely apply to the areas around the Spratley Islands, for example, that while notionally under Hainan Island's "adminstration" are well outside the PRC's 12 or even it's 200-mile limit. The linked article above says conclusively:
"...the actions outlined above are all concern with Chinese territory or territorial waters – not the much larger maritime areas that press accounts have suggested."
In other words, using the map above to conclude that the PRC is saying it has the right to "...inspect, detain or expel foreign ships illegally entering waters..." less than 50 miles off the coast of Brunei, say, would be taking counsel from fear.

But I am watching to see what, if any, further explication of this statement comes from Hainan. Interesting times, perhaps?

Sunday, October 14, 2012

Never, never, never...

Interesting little animation presenting the position plots of Royal Navy vessels across the globe, starting before WW1 and ending in the 1920's.

Looking at this brings to mind a couple of thoughts;

For all that we talk about "blue-water navies" human beings still don't really use most or even much of the world's ocean surface. Trade routes still lead largely through littoral waters and a handful of critical choke points like Suez, Panama, the Java Straits, and the capes of Good Hope and Horn.

Perhaps the single most enormous change in human history over the past century has been the disarmament of the narrow seas off western Europe. From Roman times the Mediterranean, Baltic, North Sea, the Channel and the Western Approaches of the Atlantic Ocean have probably seen more bloodshed than anywhere on the world's waters. But for more than fifty years the waters around Europe have seen little if any fighting; the Med perhaps as much as any, but outside of the coastal waters off Libya and Israel even that old cockpit has been ridiculously peaceful by contrast.
And I am far from alone in wondering if the next hundred years will see the South China Sea and the western Pacific Ocean will become the next place where angry humans will meet in battle on the seas.
(h/t to Lawyers, Guns, and Money for both of the naval links...)

Thursday, April 30, 2009

Arrgh! (Redux): Who Wants Some?

Interesting little news item:

The "hero" captain (IMO, frankly, just another goddam statistic in the loathesome "everybody is a hero!" sweepstakes the American news media seems to be running) of the Maersk Alabama testified today in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (although why Foreign Relations and not Commerce, I can't fathom).

"Commercial ships working pirate-infested waters should be protected by an armed corps of senior officers backed by the government, Maersk Alabama Capt. Richard Phillips told Congress Thursday"

Okay.

But here's what I found interesting. His boss, the CEO of the Maersk Line, did too.

"Arming merchant sailors may result in the acquisition of ever more lethal weapons and tactics by the pirates, a race that merchant sailors cannot win," Maersk Inc. Chairman John P. Clancey said in his prepared remarks."

When we had this discussion over at "buggieboy" earlier this month, I said:

"Other potential issues with the Q-ships would be the immense potential for liability in arming the sort of crews that sail a lot of these vessals. The old days of the Western merchant marines is long gone. Most of the deck crews of these ships are what a Victorian Briton would have called "lascars": Sri Lankan, Indonesian, or Korean contract sailors - basically coastal villagers with a couple of weeks training. Handing out rifles and grenade launchers to these guys? Lloyds would scream like a wounded eagle.

The alternative would be for the shipping companies to hire contract gun crews. But picture the problems and expense that would entail. You have twenty container ships that transit the Horn every quarter. You lose one a year; 0.25 ships/quarter. The ransom is 10 million dollars, or $2.5 million/quarter.

Meanwhile, you're hiring 20 gun crews a quarter, four men at $1,000/day; $360,000 per ship per quarter, roughly $7 million per quarter or $28 million a year.

This makes no sense, economically. They're financially better off paying the ransoms, and the pirates probably know that as well as we do."

And here's the proof; confronted with his own employee talking about getting armed guards on merchies, the operators of the merchant shipping lines would rather encourage their engine room crews to take up juggling live torpedoes on their break time.

What I think this points up is the problem with taking complex real-world socio-polito-military problems and trying to reduce them to news-bite talking points. The Somalis involved in this stuff aren't one-dimensional movie villians. Their reasons for freebooting are complicated and difficult to solve; a couple of bombing raids, an Ethiopian invasion...these not solutions are, young padawan, Master Yoda would say. The bottom line here is there probably IS no single simple, elegant solution; political, military or otherwise. The best answer may well be a combination of guile, force, bribery and avoidance.

But you can't put that on a bumper sticker, or get a blow-dried newsreader to put it across to a viewing audience full of Diet Pepsi and Chee-tos. So chances are we will never have any sort of sensible debate on what, if anything, the U.S. should do about it.

Whatever.

The real bottom line is that talking about pirates lets me post pictures of sexy pirate wenches. Arrrgh! There's a sight to shiver me timbers, eh, buckos?

And not just for the lads - here's an equal opportunity cheese-and-beefcake cover for all comers.

As an aside, I've always gotten a bit of a chuckle out of the latter-day romantic image of the buccaneer. Back in the day they were categorized as what they are, the seagoing equivalent of a mugger or a carjacker. Dangerous, violent waterborne vermin that were the lawful prey of every decent sailor or traveller who objected to robbery, rape and wanton destruction. The contemporary accounts from the great Age of Piracy in the mid-17th to the late 18th Centuries were almost exactly the same as our tabloid press coverage of crime: fascinated but horrified, a sort of violence voyeurism for the safe in bed.

It was only AFTER the sea lanes were tamed that piracy became romantic and writers (and later filmmakers) started penning odes to the jolly roger.But isn't that the whole idea? I've always loved this definition of "adventure": "Someone else having a frightening, dangerous, difficult ordeal several thousand miles away."

Monday, December 01, 2008

Commander's Intent I: Arrrrggh!!!

Back when I was just a baby soldier I and the Army made a very serious mistake. I wanted - and the Army accepted and encouraged me to attempt - to be a Special Forces medic.The ideal of the Special Forces is that of (as their own website puts it):"...Francis Marion, the WWII OSS Jedbourg Teams and Detachment 101 in Burma, as well as the Alamo Scouts." They are supposed to be the "global scouts", the eyes of the Army, as well as leaders in organizing peoples in other lands to - again in theory - resist oppression (the SF motto is "De Oppresso Liber", "We liberate the oppressed") and fight for things that we as Americans are supposed to want other peoples to have: democracy, liberty, equal justice under law.

So you get the picture? Not just military muscle, which is what the Chief ended up as once he settled into the 82nd Airborne, but muscle with a brain behind it. As one of the SF types put it himself back in the Vietnam days, "We go in, organize, train, win their hearts and minds, and if it all goes to shit we can blow the hell out of the place and leave".So the one thing that my time in the SF training program helped me really understand was what the Army calls an Operations Order. It's a fairly useful little format designed to simplify the process of taking a gaggle of armed men from Point A to Point B in good order and accomplishing whatever it is that the movement was intended to do once they get there.One thing I learned was that perhaps the MOST critical part of the OPORD was the first part of Paragraph 3 (Execution), the so-called "Commander's Intent". This is where the boss describes to his henchmen the central idea of what they're doing. All the rest is details. Important details, yes, but just the working plan. So if everything else goes to hell, is it so often does, the commander's intent is supposed to enable the survivors to regroup and drive on. "Okay, well. That sucked. But here's what the Old Man wanted us to do, here's what happened and here's where we are now, so..."

The past week or so has got me thinking about the notion of commander's intent, our foreign policy, and why we so often seem to find ourselves reading about military and politico-military actions in the papers that make you shake your head and say "What the..??"

First was a spate of articles about piracy off the Horn of Africa.Now pirates are great news, first of all, since who the hell doesn't love pirates? Suzanne Vega nails it when she sings "...maybe it's the clothing that's so entertaining, the earrings and swashbuckling blouses that please."

Today's Blog Post Theme: Suzanne Vega - Last Year's Troubles
Who can't swoon for Captain Jack Sparrow and Tyrone Power yo-ho-hoing the Spanish Main and sweeping up Maureen O'Hara in a muscular embrace as the extras hoist the anchor w' a wannion, arrrrgh?

Even modern-day pirates have their fans, even if their tongues are firmly in their cheeks.

The sad reality is that the buccaneers of yesterday were the 18th and 19th Century equivalent of the Somali pirates of today: dirty, desperate hard men with nothing but weapons and the will to use them on people too powerless to resist them. Piracy has always been with us, the waterborne version of robbery with violence, the seagoing reminder of Plautus' warning: Homo homini lupus.

Just as settled human societies (nomads another matter, of course) have always seen the supression of robbery as a civic virtue, so the pursuit and extirpation of piracy has always been a sort of lex universalis of the sea. Our country's early history saw the suppression of piracy as one of our FIRST Middle Eastern adventures; the damn Marines still warble about the "shores of Tripoli" as if it was yesterday. The pirate is the enemy of all sailors, and all navies, regardless of the positions of their governments vis a vis each other, have regarded pirates as a common enemy since Caesar's day.

But the common theme of the stories we're reading about these bold Somali buckos is that for all our carrier strike groups, nuclear attack submarines and global naval power projection capability...the U.S. Navy seems just as stymied as the Indians and the British at the project of protecting Red Sea and west Indian Ocean shipping from these ex-fishermen-turned-searobbers.Ideas floating around the Horn (along with flaming Thai shrimp boats) have included baiting traps with armed merchantmen ("Q ships", an idea right out of the Great War), close blockade, airstrikes and actual invasions of the Somali coast.

So here's the FDChief's First Lesson In The Law Of Unintended Consequences When You Don't State the Commander's Intent. Because my single, ugliest, biggest honkin' enormous problem with what my comrade-in-getting-our-records-fucked-up-at-DA Ranger Jim accurately terms the "Phony War on Terror": the man who authored the phrase, the man that Republicans like to call our "Commander in Chief" (though as a civilian I'd like to state that he's my President, and as such doesn't "command" squat around the Fire Direction Center...) has never really made a clear, concise, sensible statement of the intent of the military and politically aggressive actions we've taken as part of the PWOT. In short, other than "Bomb Islam", we seem to have no coherant, sensible strategy for all this effing around in the wilds of south and southwst Asia and North Africa.That's critical. And I belive that it ties right back into the piracy mess.

First, politically, we've been as stupid as a people and a country could be about the Horm of Africa. "We" includes, of course, the Brits, who have to include Somalia in their "If Not For the Portugese, Belgians, French, and Italians, We'd Be The Worst Fucking Imperialists In History" portfolio, the Italians (natch), the UN, and us. This isn't to let the Somalis off the hook: they've been busy screwing up their country since the late Eighties, one of the few disasters of the late Eighties/early Nineties that can't be attributed to George H.W. Bush or Duran Duran. But one of the biggest ready-fire-aim's of the PWOT period was the Ethiopian Invasion of 2006.

Say what you want about the Islamic Courts: they were hard men for a hard land. But because the only notion of "Commander's Intent" in the PWOT seems to be "If it calls itself Islamic, bomb it" the U.S. openly assisted the Ethiopians - ancient and modern tribal enemies of the Somali clans - to invade!

WTF!!??

I'm a Scot, at least the identifiable part of me is. If you came to me and said, Chief, I'm worried about the possibility of terrorism emerging from a post-partition Scotland governed by radical Celtic supporters in Edinburgh, so I think the U.S. should arm and encourage the British Army to invade and occupy the country from the Marches to the Isles. Whaddya think?" I'd reply (after checking your pupils and sniffing your breath): "Are you fucking NUTS? Certifiable? How much crack HAVE you been smoking?!?" Because in terms of failing, nothing fails as spectacularly as encouraging the ancient tribal enemies of a people to invade them.And, sure enough, the Ethiopian invasion appears to be failing, not before having gone a long way to destroying whatever of "government" remained in the Beyond-Thunderdome world of the Somali region of Africa. Whatever chance remained for political and social stability to absorb the piratical energy of these Somali swashbucklers failed with it.

And militarily, our inability to redefine what "national security" means in the PWOT Era means that the U.S. Navy remains hardcanned inside the Carrier War that has been raging in Norfolk and Pearl since 1941.Our littoral combat capabilities have atrophied to nothing from the heyday of the "Mobile Riverine Force" of the Vietnam War, the latest incarnation of the "Brown Water Navy" tradition that stretches back to the U.S. Civil War.Plus I suspect that the irrationally fearful Force Protection instinct that my Army and the Navy have developed in the VOLAR period would hamper truly agressive anti-piracy patrols for fear of a USS Cole sort of attack.So here we are; Swanning around with no idea of how to actually FIGHT guys like Osama, no PLAN for fighting guys like the Somali pirates, an Army ass-deep in central Asia and a Navy stuck at the Battle of Midway or rereading Red Storm Rising. Out of options, out of time, and with a bloodthirsty mob of Somali Jack Sparrows sitting on the Dead Man's Chest.

I wanted to talk about the Masacre in Mumbai as a symptom of the same failure of planning, but this post is already too long. So that's for next time.

Hope you had a good holiday weekend.

Up next: Indian Take-out, or, "My Security Service Sent Me To Bollywood And All I Got Was This Stupid Bullethole"