Over at his joint Defence and Freedom Sven links to a paper discussing a topic I've mentioned here (but more often over at the MilPub) before; the actual military value of airborne troops in modern times.
I had a fun time playing paratrooper back in the day, but even in the 1980s I had a hard time imagining surviving the run-in to a truly well-defended drop zone. The combination of better target acquisition devices (i.e. radar) and a profusion of shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles seemed to present an impossible thicket to force compared to the big drops of the 1940s.
That and the fact that a defending force with even a small group of relatively light armored vehicles (like Paraguay's old Shermans!) could do some pretty serious damage to paratroops if they were on hand before the units could assemble and scrounge up their light antitank weapons. The linked paper's author, one Marc Devore, points out all of this and that, based on their unwillingness to hazard airborne operations in real wars, the planners and operational commanders of the major airborne powers know this.